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I. INTRODUCTION

For the last twenty years, labor union memberships have been on the
decline.' As a result, unions have been forced to design strategies and programs in

IHerbert R Northrup, "Salting" the Contractors'LaborForce: Construction Unions Organizingwith
NLRB Assistance, 14 J. LAB. RS. 469 (1993); Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The ProtectedStatus
of Paid Union Organizers, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (stating that "although union members
comprised 25.8% of the total workforce in 1974, that figure had declined to 15.5% in 1994").
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an effort to reverse or at least slow down this decline.2 To say the least, unions have
been very lethargic about organizing efforts to slow this decline? Recently though,
certain unions have implemented plans that are allowing them to combat unionavoidance tactics by the companies and have enabled the unions to communicate
more effectively and efficiently with non-union workers.4 One of the union's most
effective and most controversial tactics is known as "salting." 5 "Salting" is a
technique where the union organizers apply forjobs at nonunion companies with the
intent of organizing their workers. For many years, the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) has faithfully held that "salts" or paid union organizers are
"employees" and are protected by section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).' However, this long established holding was an issue of controversy in the
2 See Northrup, supra note 1, at 1341. "Even with the stepped-up organizing efforts over the last few

years, federal figures show that the percentage of construction workers belonging to unions has
dropped from 42% in 1970 to 19% last year." David G. Savage & Stuart Silverstein, High Court
Extends Job Protectionsto Organizers; Labor: Ruling Likely to Boost Recruiting Efforts. JusticesSay
Firms Can't Fire Employees Who are Also Paid by Unions, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995, at
DI.
3 Northrup, supra note 1, at 469.
4 Note, supra note 1, at 1341.

See id. at 1341 (explaining that "unions send organizers (salts) to apply for jobs as employees in the
non-unionized workplace [in effect to organize them]"). Board Member Oviatt "regarded salts as
'reminiscent of the Trojan Horse whose innocuous appearance shields a deadly enemy."' Id. at 1343.
6 See id. at 1341.
' National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 141. Section 2(3) of the NLRA
provides:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this [Act] explicitly states otherwise,
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status
of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not
an employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3). DINAH PAYNE ET AL., The Fate of Full-Time, Paid Union Organizers as
Employees: What Next From the Supreme Court?, LAB. L. J., June 1995, at 371; Brief for the National
Labor Relations Board at 10, NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S.Ct. 450 (1995) (No. 94947) [hereinafter Brief for NLRB]; Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 (1975) (deciding that paid
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circuit courts throughout the country on a recurring basis.8 In Town & Country
Electric,Inc. v. NLRB,9 the Supreme Court was asked to resolve the issue of whether
salts or paid union organizers were "employees" as defined in Section 2(3) of the
NLRA.'0 In a 9-0 decision, Justice Breyer held that a "worker may be a company's
'employee,' within the terms of the NLRA, even if, at the same time, a union pays
1
that worker to help the union organize the company.""
The Town & Country decision was a very important event to unions because
the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's interpretation of the term
for the first time
"employee."' 2 The facts of the case convinced the Court that the NLRB's rationale
was within the NLRA's language. The court reasoned that: (1) the NLRB's
interpretation supported the NLRA's purposes; and, (2) the interpretation followed
the Court's past decisions. 3 Additionally, the Town & Country decision has special
significance because the Court took the opportunity to eliminate the controversy and
give guidance to the circuits to follow.
This Comment examines the decision of the Supreme Court in Town &
Country, Inc. v. NLRB and explores the possible consequences of the Court's
opinion. In Part II, there will be a brief overview on the history of "salting." This
analysis will cover what "salting" is, how it is used, and the test used by the NLRB
in deciding these types of cases. Also, there will be a brief look at one strategy
adopted by a particular construction union. Part III of this Comment will contain
a concise statement of the facts surrounding this case. In Part IV, there will be a
general overview of the law concerning paid union organizers. A large portion of
this part will discuss the split among the various circuit courts that have addressed

union organizers were entitled to protection under the NLRA).
' Nancy Montwieler, Supreme Court Will Determine ifRefusal to Hire Union Organizers Violates
NLRA, BNA U.S. L. WK., Jan. 26, 1995, at d5 (stating that "the government asked the justices to
resolve a continuing conflict in the circuits over whether a paid union organizer is an 'employee'
within the meaning of section 2(3) of the act. The issue also is presented in more than 70 cases
pending before the NLRB ....).
I NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995).
'0 Id. at 452.
IId. at 450.
22 See Bernie Mower & Brian Lockett, Supreme CourtSustains Union Use of 'Salting'as Organizing
Tactic, BNA U.S. L. WK., Dec. 8, 1995, at d5 (stating that "in a victory for organized labor, the U.S.
Supreme Court has ruled that the National Labor Relations Board properly interpreted the word
'employee' to include paid union organizers or 'salts').

"3 Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 451.
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this issue. Part V will consist of a discussion of the holding of the Town & County
case, and the rationale used by the court to reach its decision and the arguments
offered by Town & Country. Finally, Part VI will consist of the analysis of the
decision, examining the implications of the decision. It will show how the union
sees the decision helping its efforts and the company's viewpoint on the decision.
II. HISTORY OF SALTING
The tactic of "salting" is not a new strategy for unions.' 4 Labor unions have
been placing staff or union members as hires into companies for many years. 5 This
tactic has been traced back to when the "Industrial Workers of the World used it to
organize lumber camps at the turn of the century."' 16 However, the tactic has been
used by unions only sparingly throughout the years. 7 As labor unions struggle to
maintain their sagging memberships, the tactic's "popularity has re-emerged during
the last several years."' 8
A.

How Salting is Applied

When a construction union targets a company, two things can happen. First,
the union may ask the company to sign a pre-hire agreement 9 providing for the
union to be the exclusive bargaining representative of the workforce.2" Second, if

14Kenneth C. Crowe, High Court Gives Unions a Boost/Planting Organizersis Allowed, NEWSDAY,

Nov. 29, 1995, at A39.
15 Northrup,

supra note 1, at 470.

16 Id.

'" See

Savage & Silverstein, supra note 2, at D1.

18 Id.

" Susan E. Howe, To Be or Not To Be an Employee: That is the Question of Salting, 3 GEO. MASON
INDEPENDENT L. REv. 515, 518 (1995). Howe explains:
When the Landrum-Griffin Act amended the NLRA in 1959, it restricted certain
union practices and provided for the use of 'pre-hire agreements' in the
construction industry, thus allowing a construction company to establish a union
as its exclusive bargaining agent without a majority of employees having
expressed support for union representation.
Id. at 553 n.19.
20

Id. at 518.
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this does not work, a salting campaign" may be implemented by the union.22 When
a salting campaign is instituted, the union salts go to the nonunion company for jobs
en masse."3 The "salters" openly put the employer on notice of their union
affiliation and their intent to organize the employer's labor force.24 As a
consequence, a number of things can happen: (1) an open-shop' construction
contractor is unionized; (2) a union contractor replaces the open-shop contractor; (3)
unfair labor practice charges will be filed by the union; or (4) the salters are hired.26
B.

Wright Line Test

Oftentimes, if the company refuses to hire the salters, the salter's recourse
is to file unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. Once charges have been filed
and after the NLRB reviews the charges, the General Counsel of the NLRB must

Note, supra note 1, at 1347. The salting campaign magnifies the strategies used by the employers
and the unions:
[E]ach side in the competition over unorganized workers reacts to the other's
2,

tactics and tries to shape labor law to privilege its conduct. The unease with
which some observers regard the unions' salting strategy may reflect a distaste for
the coordinated role that unions, as institutions, play in the campaign against nonunion firms. Yet the NLRA protects the activities of unions with legitimate
concerns for the situation of employees throughout their industry.
Id.
' Howe, supra note 19, at 518 (explaining that "during such a campaign, the union expressly waives
its prohibition, usually contained in the union's constitution or bylaws, against members working for
a non-union company provided that the employment is sought for the exclusive purpose of organizing
the employer").
' See id.at 519; see also Fluor Daniel Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 970, 974 (1991) (During a union organizing
campaign against Fluor Daniel, a national open shop contractor, the Savannah Building Trade Unions
submitted a batch of 48 applications to the company.); Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1224
(1992) (The union submitted 90 applications in four batches to Sunland.).
24

Id.

' An "open shop" is a business where union and nonunion workers are employed indiscriminately and
which union membership is not a condition of securing or maintaining employment. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990).
26 Northrp, supra note 1, at 475; see Sunland Constr.Co., at 1224 (1992); see also Howe, supra note

19, at 517 n. 117 (stating that "the filing of labor charges is vital to the success of the salting campaign.
Sunland signed a settlement agreement with the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers on
September 16, 1994. The NLRB approved the agreement, which provided that the union would
withdraw the unfair labor practice charge filed with the NLRB and that the company would recognize
the union.").
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make a prima facie case to proceed. 7 The Board adopted in Wright Line a test for
establishing the prima facie case.28 Under the Wright Line test, the General Counsel
must show an "inference that [the employer's opposition to] protected conduct was
a 'motivating factor' in the employer's [discharge or hiring] decision."29 To
maintain a prima facie case, the General Counsel must prove that the employee
participated in a protected union activity, had knowledge of the activity by the
employer, and the employer's anti-union animus.3"
If the General Counsel meets its burden, the burden of production shifts to
the employer.3 Then, the employer must show: "(1) that improper motivations had
no part in the employment decision; or (2) that the same action would have been
taken regardless of (a) the employee's involvement in protected activities; or (b) the
employer had no anti-union animus. '' 32 Indeed, it would seem that if a union "salter"
notifies an employer of his union affiliation and his intentions, and the "salter" is
denied a job or hired and then discharged, the "salter" would file an unfair labor
practice charge with the NLRB alleging the company would not hire the "salter"
because of his or her union affiliation.33
To this end, the labor charges forthcoming by the union "salter" puts the
employer in a precarious position.34 The employer is faced with two choices: (1)
hire the "salters" who want to organize his workforce or (2) refuse to hire them and

27

NLRB v. Wright Line Inc., 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).

28 Id. at 901-02.
29

Id.

3 Id.; see Howe, supra note 19, at 520. Howe states:
Disclosure of an applicant's union activities automatically fills the first two of
these Wright Line requirements while also effectively denying the employer the
affirmative defense of ignorance of the applicant's union status. "[P]roof that the
employer had knowledge of the affected employee's union allegiance or activities
when the action was taken' is 'an essential step in proving the existence of
unlawful union animus."
Id.
3' See
32

Wright Line Inc., 662 F.2d at 904.

See id. at 901-02.

33 Id.
34 See

Howe, supra note 19, at 520.
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await the pending labor charges." If the Wright Line test is met, the company will
be ordered to hire or reinstate the "salters" with backpay.3 6 Therefore, "no matter
what action the employer takes, under the current NLRB policy, the employer is
effectively37forced to hire a known union activist who is intent on salting the
company.
C.

ConstructionIndustry Salting

One example of a designed plan to use the tactic of salting [or sprinkling]
in an employer's workforce has been renewed in the construction industry.38 The
reoccurrence of this tactic has been brought about because of major legal
developments over the past decade which have restricted the union's ability to
communicate with the unorganized employees.39 Succinctly, the strategy consists
of the unions40 sending union organizers to nonunion workplaces to seek
employment.4 In 1993, the Building and Construction Trades Department (BCTD)
of the AFL-CIO, which consists of fifteen various construction trades unions,
35Id.
36 Id.
31 Id. at 520-21.

38Id.
3' See Union Tactics Against Companies, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigationsof the House Comm. on Economic andEducationalOpportunities,104th Cong., (1995)

(statement of John J. Barry, President, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO);
see also Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 562 (1973) (under this decision construction employers
were essentially allowed to commit unfair tactic as a way to avoid their collective bargaining
agreements); John Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating
that an employer could terminate its bargaining relationship with the union at the end of a prehire
agreement, if the union had not secured and won a NLRB representation election); HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational

Opportunities, 104th Cong., (1995) (statement of Robert A. Georgine, President, Building and
Construction Trades Department AFL-CIO).
" See Howe, supra note 19, at 517 n.12 (explaining that the International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers (IBB); the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
(UBCJ) are well known for their use of salting.); see Northrup, supranote 1, at 470.
4"Note, supra note 1, at 1341, (stating that "although some 'salts' are professional organizers who
continue to draw their union salary for organizing, others are 'volunteers organizers' who often apply
en masse and to whom the union typically pays the difference between the union wage scale and the
pay at the new job").
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designed and instituted an organizing campaign involving salting tactics called
"Construction Organizing Membership Education Training" (COMET).42
The COMET plan is based, in part, on the tactic of salting which has seen
an increased rate of use since the Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere, Inc. v.
NLRB.43 In Lechmere, the court gave "employers [the] right to exclude nonemployee organizers from private property." In Lechmere, the union alleged that
the company was committing unfair labor practices by not allowing the union
organizers on its property to pass out pro-union handbills.45 The Supreme Court
agreed that nonunion employees should have access to information to assist them
in self-organization.4 6 However, the Court maintained that the "[p]lain terms of the
NLRA confer rights only on employees, not on unions or their non-employee
' Nonetheless,
organizers."47
the NLRB has clarified the Lechmere" decision and has
42

Howe, supra note 19, at 517. Howe reported:

Under COMET, all members of BCTD unions receive extensive training in
organizing tactics and are taught their rights under the NLRA. With unions
representing less than 21 percent of construction workers and open-shop
contractors performing more than 70 percent of construction, COMET enlists all
BCTD union members in an aggressive 'bottom-up' salting campaign against nonunion contractors.
Id. at 517-18.
4 Note, supra note 1, at 1348; Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1992).
Note, supra note 1, at 1348. The Note explains:
In Lechmere, the Court rejected the Board's policy of balancing the targeted
employee's organizing rights against the employer's property rights. Instead, the
Court limited access for non-employee organizers to private property to cases in
which the employees are 'inaccessibl(e)' by 'reasonable' alternative means. By
restricting the section 7 right to engage in concerted activities to employees
themselves, while 'trivializ(ing)' their interests in obtaining information about
unions, the Lechmere decision impels organizers interested inreaching employees
to become statutory 'employees' themselves by applying for ajob at the company.
Id.
45 Howe, supra note 19, at 525.
46 See id.

'7

Id. Howe related:

The Court "explained that the NLRB erred by failing to make the critical
distinction between the organizing activities of employees (to whom section 7
guarantees the right of self-organization) and non-employees (to whom section 7
applies only derivatively)." The Supreme Court reiterated its support for one
exception to the rule that allows unions access to the employer's private property
if the employees would otherwise be "beyond the reach of reasonable union
efforts to communicate with them." Consequently, the majority inLechmere held

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol99/iss3/8

8

Dickens: Town & Country Electric, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board:
TOWN & COUNTRY v. NLRB

1997]

rightly held that it does not apply to Section 2(3) employees. 9 Consequently, the
Lechmere decision did not clear the waters concerning the definition of "employee"
in Section 2(3).50 Thus, the stage was set for the court to address this issue in Town
& Country.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

The Facts
Town & Country, a non-union electrical contractor based in Wisconsin, won

a contract to do repair work at a paper mill in International Falls, Minnesota.:5 After
obtaining the contract, Town & Country found out, under Minnesota law, that for
every two unlicensed electricians working on the job there must also be at least one
Minnesota licensed journeyman electrician on the job. 2 Since Town & Country had
no electricians with Minnesota licenses, they retained Ameristaff Personnel
Contractors to recruit electricians for the job. 3

that an employer is not obligated to provide nonemployee organizers access to the
employer's private property unless the union meets the "heavy" burden of
establishing that "unique obstacles" exist.
Id. at 525-26 (citations omitted).
" Note, supranote 1, at 1343 (stating that "the Board distinguished Lechmere....as a property-rights
decision that did not affect the rights under the NLRA of job applicants and other statutory
'employees"').
4 See id. at 1348-49. The Note reports:
First, and most important, the employer may bring to bear only whatever right to
exclude trespassers is recognized under relevant state law; Lechmere does not
incorporate into the NLRA a particular substantive property right. Second, the
Lechmere rule applies only to non-employees and does not limit organizing
activities from by off-duty employees. Third, the employer may not exclude
union organizers from his property if, by allowing others to solicit on the property,
he discriminates against the union. Finally, the Board has held that Lechmere
guarantees private property protection not only against organizing activity, but
also against area-standards picketing and handbilling.
Id. at 1348-49.
" See id. at 1349.

5'Brief for International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 292 at 2, NLRB v. Town & Country
Elec., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 450 (1995) (No. 94-947) [hereinafter Brief for IBEW].
52

Id. at 2.

" Id. at 3.
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As applicants began to reply to the advertisement about the job, Ameristaff
questioned the applicants about their union status. 4 Town & Country wanted to
know if the applicants would work on a nonunion job and whether the applicant's
previous work had consisted only of union jobs. 5 As a result, Town & Country
scheduled seven applicants for interviews. 6 Shortly thereafter, local unions of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) learned about the job and
had their unemployed members apply for the job."
A!though most union
constitutions do not allow union members to work for nonunion employers, the
IBEW passed a salting resolution58 allowing its members to work for nonunion
companies in an effort to organize the job sites.59 On the day of the scheduled

" PAYNE ETAL., supra note

7, at 373.

5 Id.
56 Id.

57 Id.
51 In part, Local Union IBEW 292's resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS: a principal obligation of the members of the local union is to
organize the unorganized in order to maintain and secure our wages, benefits and
other conditions of employment and;
WHEREAS: the success of any organizing drive depends upon the support of each
and every union craftsman, both on and off the job; Therefore be it
RESOLVED: that the Business Manager be empowered to authorize members to
seek employment by nonsignatory contractors if they are willing, in addition to
the performance of work assigned by their employer, and as set forth below, to
assist in the local union's organizing program, and be it further
RESOLVED: that such members, when employed by non-signatory employers,
shall promptly and diligently carry out the electrical construction work assigned
to them by their employer for the duration of the project, and shall engage in
organizing their fellow employees only on non-work time, and/or in non-work
areas and in accordance with any lawfully promulgated distribution and
solicitation rules and be it further
RESOLVED: that such members, when employed by nonsignatory employers,
shall be compensated by the local union only for the time spent organizing before
or after working hours of the nonsignatory employer.
RESOLVED: That any member accepting employment by a nonsignatory
employer, except as authorized by this
RESOLUTION, shall be subject to charges and discipline as provided by our
constitution and bylaws.
Brief for IBEW, supra note 51, at 1-2.
"' Brief for IBEW, supra note 51, at 3.
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interviews, the IBEW members showed up for the interviews.6' After some apparent
confusion concerning the interviews, the IBEW members were told they would not
be interviewed because they did not have appointments and the interviews were
cancelled. 6
At that point, one of the IBEW members, Hansen, protested that he had
scheduled an interview that morning.62 He was granted an interview and was
reluctantly hired by Town & Country, even though it knew he was a union
Town & Country refused to interview the remaining ten union
member.6'
6
members' despite the fact that Town & Country needed more licensed electricians.
Once on the job, during a break, Hansen stated in front of one of Town & Country's
superintendents that he would attempt to organize employees for the union.' Later,
the superintendent told Hansen that "he would be fired if he continued to talk about
the union." While on lunch break, Hansen continued to discuss the benefits of the
union to the other workers.68 He was discharged that day. 69 After his discharge, the
IBEW reimbursed Hansen for the difference in wages,7" benefits, and travel

60 Id. at3.
61

Id. at 4.

62

id.

63

Id. at 4-5.

64

NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc. 116 S. Ct. 450, 452 (1995).

' Brief for NLRB, supra note 7, at 4.
66 id.
67

id.

68 Id.

69 Id.

v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 116
S. Ct. 450 (1995) (No. 94-947) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (stating that:
The Union paid Hansen One Thousand Ninety-One and 82/100 dollars

70Brief for Respondent Town & CountryElectric, Inc. at 5, NLRB

($1,091.82) for his three days' work [for Town & Country] ...[ As opposed to]

the Seven Hundred Twenty-Five and 15/100 Dollars ($725.15) he received from
Ameristaff for that same period of time. The Union's business manager testified

that, pursuant to the Union's salting resolution, all salts were to be paid on the
same basis.).
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expenses. 7
ProceedingsBelow

B.

Subsequently, the members of the IBEW who were denied interviews filed
a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board. 72 The Board issued a
complaint stating that Town & Country had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) and (3).73 The complaint alleged that Town & Country
refused to interview or hire the union members because of their union affiliation,
and that Hansen was terminated because of his union activities.74 Town & Country
countered arguing that its actions were not based on discrimination, but on the
fact that none of the applicants, nor Hansen, were bona fide 'employees' within
the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 152(3). 7 ' At a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ), the ALJ found that Town & Country had
in favor of the union.76
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA and ruled
77
The NLRB concurred and affirmed the AL's ruling.

The NLRB and the AL's findings were based on the following factors:

71 id.
72 id.

7 See id. at 5-6. The Code states:
Section 158(a)(1) of the act makes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994). Section 157 of the Act grants
employees the right, inter alia, "to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining ......
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
Section 158(a)(3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate "in regard
to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
4 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 70, at 5.
7' Id. at 6.
7f, Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 452.

' Id.See also Town & Country Electric, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1250, 1258 (1992).
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(1) The Board... reaffirmed its position in Zachry/8 that paid
union organizers are 'employees' within the meaning of Section
2(3) and are therefore protected against discriminatory refusals to
hire and discriminatory termination. 9
(2) Moreover, both the legislative history and this Court's
interpretations of the Act support a broad definition of the
statutory term 'employee.' For a paid union organizer
simultaneously to be an 'employee' of another entity also
comports with the common-law principles of agency to which
this Court has looked to define the term 'employee' in cases in
which it was left undefined by statute, the Board concluded.
Under the common-law, '[a] person may be the servant of two
masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act, if the
service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the
other.' 80
(3) [P]rotecting paid union organizers as 'employees' furthers the
Act's goal of promoting the right to organize, while leaving
intact management's legitimate rights to direct and control
employees under its supervision and to limit union solicitation to
nonwork time."'
As a remedy, the Board held that Town & Country must "offer employment to
Hansen and the union members who had been denied interviews, and make the
union members whole for any losses suffered as a result of Town & Country's
discrimination."82

78 H.B. Zachry Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 838 (1988), rev'd, 886 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1989) (the board had held

that paid union organizers who apply for or in fact work for hire for an employer are "employees"
within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act); see also Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 (1975);
John Mark Tarver, H.B. Zachry Co. v. N.L.R.B.: PaidFull-Time Union OrganizerNot an "Employee,"

50 LA. L. REV. 1211 (1990).
7 Brief for NLRB,supranote 7, at 7.
o Id. at 7-8.
82 Id. at

8.

" Id. at 8. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 1345. "The Board has rigorously enforced the traditional
make-whole remedy of reinstatement and back pay, which takes on added importance given that,
unlike the more stable employment relationships common in other sectors of the economy, building
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

C.

On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did
not agree with the Board's reasoning and reversed its decision." The Eighth
Circuit held that the Board's interpretation of "employee" was wrong.84 The
Eighth Circuit declared that there was an "inherent conflict of interest" when
professional organizers applied for jobs for the sole purpose of furthering the
union interest.8 The Eighth Circuit court relied on the common law agency
doctrine in reaching its decision to exclude organizers from NLRA coverage.86
In addition, the Eighth Circuit said that even unpaid organizers' adherence to the
union's "job salting organizing resolution" was "inimical to, and inconsistent
with, the employer-employee relationship."87 The Eighth Circuit believed that the
case involved two classes of union members: the full-time union organizers and
the other union members, including Hansen.88 In short, the court's rationale was

projects in the construction industry are of relatively brief duration." Id.
" Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 452.
84

Id.

"5Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1994).
86

Id. at 628. "When a federal statute does not helpfully define the term 'employee,' we infer that

"'Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine."' Id.
"7Id. at 629. But see Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 255-58 (4th Cir.
1994) (re-affirming Zachry) ("The Fourth Circuit, however, while disapproving the Board's remedy,
has also held that volunteer organizers are protected."); Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 744
(IIth Cir. 1992) (mem.) (enforcing 304 N.L.R.B. 970 (1991) ("The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, has enforced a Board order reinstating volunteer organizers."). Id. at 1358 n.32.
88

Town & Country Elec., Inc., 34 F.3d at 627. Brief for IBEW, supra note 51, at 10. The IBEW

stated in its brief that:
The Eighth Circuit further found that the union members who were not full-time
union officers lost their status as "employees" because they were encouraged by
their union, while unemployed, to apply for employment with Town & Country
and to organize Town & Country's employees if hired. The sole basis for this
holding was the provision of the union's organizing resolution (unknown to the
employer at the time of the refusals to hire and discharge) which reinstates the
union's usual prohibition on union members' working for nonunion employers if
the union determines that the organizing activity should cease. The Eighth Circuit
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that the term "employee" did not provide protection for those individuals who
work for a "company while a union simultaneously pays them to organize that
company."' 9 As a result, the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
decision."
The decision by the Eighth Circuit added to the confusion and
controversy over the definition of an employee under section 2(3) of the NLRA. 9'
The ambiguity regarding this issue has created a split among many of the circuit
courts.92 Finally, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in attempt to
eliminate and solve a number of issues and problems surrounding the definition
of "employees. '
IV. BACKGROUND ON EXISTING LAW

The NLRB has firmly held to its policy through the years that "paid
union organizers [or salts] are 'employees' under the NLRA despite contrary

viewed that provision as "controlling, for third-party control over a putative
employee's job tenure, in contrast to, say, an employee-initiated decision to
engage in a work stoppage, is inimical to, and inconsistent with, the employeremployee relationship."
Id.

" Town & Country Elec., Inc., 34 F.3d at 629; see also H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70, 75
(4th Cir. 1989).
o Town & Country Elec., Inc., 34 F.3d at 629.
9" Andrea F. Hoeschen & Julie Richard-Spencer, Labor and Employment Law, 43 LA. B.J. 399

(December 1995).
92 Town

& Country, 116 S. Ct. at 453; PAYNE, supra note 7, at 375; Montwieler, supranote 8, at d5;
see also Brief for NLRB, supra note 7, at 9 (stating that the circuits are split on whether paid union
organizers are employees under the Act, with the District of Columbia, Second, and Third Circuits
holding that they are, and the Fourth and Sixth Circuits holding that they are not). See Willmar Elec.
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327, 1329-31 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (enforcing an NLRB order against
Willmar for refusing to hire union organizer); NLRB v. Henlopen Mfg. Co., 599 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that a paid union organizer was an employee protected by the NLRA); H.B. Zachry
Co., 886 F.2d at 72 (holding that a paid union organizer was not an employee as defined by the
NLRA); NLRB v. Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 327 F.2d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 1964) (refusing to enforce
the NLRB order and held that the waitress was not a protected employee); Escada (USA) Inc. v.
NLRB, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a full-time paid union organizer was an employee).
'3

Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 459.
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inferences at common law."" Despite this policy, "salting" continued to cause
enormous confusion and debate among the circuit courts prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Town & Country Elec., Inc.
Split of Authority Among the Circuits

A.

The ongoing conflict, between the NLRB and the Circuit Courts,
concerning section 2(3)of the NLRA, caused the court's docket to expand."
There are two possible reasons for this increase: (1) the increasing use of salting
by unions; or (2) the employer's reluctance to accept the NLRB's policies under
section 2(3).96 When examining the cases chronologically the facts and holdings
of the cases lend some guidance to understanding the confusion and conflict that
is abound in the circuits.97
In 1964, in NLRB v. Elias Brothers Big Boy," the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB order and held that a waitress was
not a protected employee within the intent of section 2(3)." The waitress had
met with the union before seeking employment with Big Boy.'
After she was
hired, she actively assisted the union in organizing Big Boy.' For this work, she
was paid fifteen dollars a week. 2 After she was discharged, she continued to
work for the union as a full-time organizer.'3 Based on these facts, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court felt there was a strong inference that the
waitress had worked for the union all along and that she was not a bona fide

' Howe, supra note 19, at 518.
95 Id. at 533.
9'Id.
97

Id.

98 327 F.2d 421,422-27 (6th Cir. 1964).
""Id. at 427.
'0oId. at 423.
101 Id.

102 Id.

'03 Elias Bros. Big Boy, 327 F.2d at 427.
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employee under the intent of the NLRA.'04
Notwithstanding, in 1974, in Dee Knitting Mills v. NLRB, 5 the NLRB
held that an employee being paid by the union to organize did not lose her
employee status. 6 In Dee Knitting Mills, an employee was working for Dee
Knitting, while employed by the union." 7 The NLRB stated that "she was a bona
fide full-time employee within the meaning of section 2(3). " "8
In 1975, in Oak Apparel, Inc.," 9 two paid union organizers"' were hired
by Oak Apparel as employees."' The union sent the organizers to Oak Apparel
Both
to make an assessment on how the employees viewed unionization."
organizers were well qualified machine operators." 3 But, they were fired for their
organizing efforts of the other nonunion workers." 4 In making its decision, the
NLRB held that because it had consistently defined "employee" in the broadest
of terms, members of this class were entitled to the NLRA's coverage and their
rights would be protected from employers as well as unions." 5 Furthermore, the
NLRB held that any restrictive reading of section 2(3) would withhold from
discriminatees, "the status and protection to which job applicants, even

104 Id.

105Dee KnittingMills, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1974).
106 Id.
107 Id.

[as Id.

'

OakApparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 (holding that paid union organizers were entitle to protection

under Section 2(3)).
"o

Id. at 701. (The union organizers were from Local 107, International Ladies' Garment Workers'

Union, AFL-CIO.)
"'t

Id. at3.

112Id. at6.
113 Id.
224

Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. at 710.

25

Id. at701.
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prospective applicants, are entitled.""' 6
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
decided Henlopen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, holding that a paid union organizer
was "an employe[e] protected by the Act.""'
In Henlopen, a female union
organizer was discharged after being hired as an assembly line worker for
Henlopen." s Prior to being hired by Henlopen, she had volunteered as a student
organizer for the International Industrial Production Employees Union (IPEU). ,
"9
2
She was paid fifty dollars ($50) a week for organizing. ' She was told to do her
job, organize the workers, and to report back to the IPEU."' In reaching its
decision, the court's only rationale was that a paid union organizer was
protected. 122
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided H.B. Zachry Co.
v. NARB, holding that a paid union organizer was not an employee as defined by
the NLRA, reversing the NLRB.
In H.B. Zachry, Barry Edwards, a
journeyman boilermaker welder, was hired by the company at its North Carolina
work site in 1980.24 The welder was discharged some time after being hired. 2
The NLRB ordered Zachry to reinstate the welder with back pay because it had
26
committed unfair labor practices.
But, by the time the order was issued, the
27
completed.
been
had
project
In 1984 and 1985, Edwards re-applied for work with Zachry at another
116

Id.

"7

Henlopen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 26,30 (2d Cir. 1979).

"i

Id. at28.

119 Id.
120 Id.

121

Id.

12

Henlopen Mfg., 599 F.2d at 30.

'2

H.B. Zachry Co. v. NLRB, 886 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1989).

124

Id. at71.

12

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.
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project while being a full-time organizer for the union.'28 It could be inferred
from the facts that the company refused to hire him because he admitted that he
was seeking employment at Zachry to organize the plant. 2 9 Zachry's argument
to the NLRB was that "it could lawfully refuse to hire a paid, full-time,
professional union organizer."' 30 However, the NLRB followed its previous
rulings and found that the union organizer was an employee within the meaning
of the NLRA.'1 3 The Zachry Company appealed the NLRB's decision. 32
The Fourth Circuit court reasoned that the "plain meaning" of the term
"employee" meant working for only one employer as opposed to two different
employers at the same time.'33 The court held that finding Edwards an employee
would distort the "plain meaning" of the term "employee," since the union was
paying the organizer also.'34 Furthermore, the court stated that finding that a paid
union organizer was an employee would disturb the "careful balance struck by
Congress."' 35 In addition, the court was concerned that a decision of this nature
would disrupt the balance of the "Zachry employees' right to self-determination"
in representation elections.'36 Finally, the court feared that an employee's
loyalties would be divided between employers thereby affecting his
productivity.'37 Therefore, the court ruled that as long as an employer does not
discriminate against union employees, it was management's right to hire only
those workers who would answer to only one employer.'38 To that end, the Court
of Appeals held that a "paid full-time union organizer [is] not [a] bona fide

"I H.B. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 71.
129

Id.

130Howe, supra note 19, at 535.
"ItH.B. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 71.
32

Id. at 72.

"I Id. at 73.
134 id.
"

Id. at 74.

136

H.R. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 74.

117Id. at 75.
138 id.
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'applicant' and [is] not covered by the National Labor Relations Act." 39
After the Fourth Circuit's decision in H.B. Zachry, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the NLRB's decision in
Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB.140 On appeal, the court granted enforcement
of the NLRB's order against Willmar on the grounds that it had refused to hire
a union organizer because of his affiliation with the IBEW.' 4 ' In Willmar Elec.
Serv., a journeyman electrician named Hendrix was working for the IBEW as a
field organizer. 42 Sometime later, Hendrix applied for a job with Willmar. "'
On his application Hendrix stated that he worked for the IBEW and if hired,
would attempt to organize the other employees during his free time.'
Willmar
refused to hire him because, as one of Willmar's foreman said, "it's
kind
of hard
1 45
to hire [him] when [he's] out there on the other side, picketing. ,
The court explained that the real issue in the case was "whether Hendrix's
employment ties to the union disqualified him from being a Willmar employee
enjoying full protection of the Act."' 4 6 In affirming the NLRB's holding, the
court held that "Hendrix would have been indistinguishable from a zealous
volunteer who resolved to use his free time . . . to advance the union's
interests."' 4 7 Furthermore, the court said that a person holding simultaneous jobs
1 '4
was only moonlighting and that he could not be excluded as an "employee.

'9
H.B. Zachry, 886 F.2d at 70; see Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 251, 254
(4th Cir. 1994) (Reaffirming Zachry, the Court held that an application from a union organizer,
applying for work at the direction of the union employer, was 'qualitatively different from that of a
bona fide applicant. Because the union organizer would work for the employer only to carry out his
duties as a union organizer and would be paid by the union at the same time, he was not 'in search of
ajob' with the expectations of employment.).

"' Willmar Elec. Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
141

Id. at 1328.

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

14

Willmar Elec. Serv., 986 F.2d at 1328.

"1

Id. at 1329.

1,7

Id.

148

id.
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Thus, the court used the common law principles of agency in that "[a] person
may be the servant of two masters, not joint employers, at one time as to one act,
149
if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other."
Willmar argued to the court that hiring a union employee increased the
risk of disloyalty by the employee. 5 The court suggested that the Act does not
stop the employer from taking whatever remedial action is necessary to prevent
disloyalty.'
Willmar also argued that allowing a union representative to vote
in a representation could result in serious ramifications.'5 2 The court held that
"qualification as an 'employee' is not the same as eligibility to vote; he could be
included in a bargaining unit only if found to share the necessary community of
interest with the other workers."' 53 Finally, Willmar argued that there was case
law that prevented giving the union members who are employees the right to use
the employer's property for propagandizing. 5 4 The court rejected Willmar's
rationale, stating that a union organizer, on the company's property would be in
a better position to advocate the union's benefits, but so would any other union
zealot who was working for Willmar.'5 5
Also in 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
decided Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, in which a paid union organizer was
discharged for attempting to organize the employer's warehouse workers for
Local 138 of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union.' 56 In Escada,
the Board rejected Board Member Oviatt's dissenting opinion in which he relied
upon the Zachry case for his support.'57 Instead, the court followed the Board's

Id. at 1329-30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OFAGENCY § 226 (1958); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992) ("Where a statute containing that term [employee] does not
helpfully define it, this Court presumes that Congress means an agency law definition unless it clearly
'I

indicates otherwise.").
So

WillmarElec.Serv., 968 F.2d at 1330.

151

id.

152 Id.
153

id.

154 id.

'"

WillmarElec.Serv., 968 F.2d at 1330.

156Escada (USA), Inc. v. NLRB, 970 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1992).
...
Id. at 898; Howe, supra note 19, at 245.
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previous holdings in Oak Apparel, Zachry, and Willmar in making its decision.'58
In yet another 1992 case, FluorDaniel v. NLRB, 59 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the NLRB's order that union
organizers were employees. 60 The NLRB had upheld an Administrative Law
Judges' ("AL") findings that Fluor had committed unfair labor practices towards
the union applicants.' 6' The ALJ confirmed that his decision was "bound by the
Board 'rather than by appellate court precedent' and distinguished the facts in
Fluor Daniel from Zachry on the basis that Zachry involved a paid union
62
organizer."
V. THE DECISION

Finally, in Town & Country, the United States Supreme Court was asked
to resolve the inherent ambiguity in the term "employee" as it relates to the
National Labor Relations Act. 63 Justice Breyer, writing for the Supreme Court,
held that "[t]he Board's construction of the word 'employee' is lawful; [and] that
term does not exclude paid union organizers.', 64 The unanimous court essentially
held that the NLRB is statutorily required to interpret the section 152(3) language
of the NLRA and that its definition of "[t]he term 'employee' shall include any
employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer,
unless this subehapter explicitly states otherwise."1' 65
Basically, the Court's decision recognized paid union organizers as
employees. 6 6 In so holding, the Court adopted the NLRB's expansive reading
of the term employee because Congress created the agency to oversee and enforce

358

Howe, supra note 19, at 245.

I5'
Id. at 245; Fluor Daniel v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 744 (1992) (enforcing the NLRB's order without
issuing an opinion).
16'Howe,

supra note 19, at 245.

161Id. at 246.
362 Id.

163Town

& Country, 116 S. Ct. at 452.

'64Id. at 457.
165Id. at 451.
'66

Id. at 452.
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the NLRA.' 67 Therefore, its interpretations should be given "considerable
deference."' 6 8 Finally, the Court determined that the NLRB's previous
interpretation was justified based on statutory mandates, legislative history and
prior decisions by the Court.'69 However, the Court did not address the issues of:
(1) whether a paid organizer shared the requisite "community of interest" with the
other employees to allow him to vote in a representation election; or (2) the issue
of Town & Country's failure to interview or hire workers who were being paid
by the union. 7
To resolve this ambiguity, the Court's decision in Town & Country was
71
based on a dictionary definition, Congressional reports, and case law.'
Likewise, the Court addressed the reasoning behind the NLRB's interpretation.
First, the Court confirmed that the Board's holding was "consistent with the broad
12
language of the Act" and that paid union organizers should not be excluded.
The Court explained that the Act's language was analogous to the plain dictionary
definition of the term "employee"'7 because the Act states the term as "shall
include any employee."' 74 Additionally, the Court said that the Act included
exceptions but that none applied in this case. 75 Second, the Court found that the
NLRB's interpretation of the term employee was consistent with the NLRA's
purposes, especially the right to participate in protected concerted activities
without interference from the employer. 7 6 Third, the Town & Country Court

67 Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 453.
168 Id.

169Id.
370 Id.

at 457.

'71 Id.

at 454.

" Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 453.
,73Id. at 453; AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 604 (3d ed. 1992) (stating that "employee" includes

any person who works for another in return for financial or other compensation). See also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that an employee is a person in the service of another
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the employer has the power or
right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed).
17'Town & Country, 116
'75

S. Ct. at 454. See also 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).

Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 454.

176 id.
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held that the broad reading of the statute was consistent with the Supreme Court's
prior decisions.'
Finally, the Court relied on 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1) (1988) of
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 78 The Court decided that the
LMRA language allowed an employer's employee to work for a union.' 79 The
Court concluded that if Town & Country's arguments on the statute's reading
were followed, "there would not seem to be many (or any) human beings to
which this last phrase could apply."' 8 °
Next, Justice Breyer addressed all of Town & Country's arguments.''
The premise of Town & Country's argument was based on the common-law
agency doctrine."2 Town & Country argued that by applying the common-law
agency doctrine, an employee who works for the union as a paid organizer should
be excluded from coverage.8 3 In support of this assertion, Town & Country
quoted a section of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.'
Town & Country further argued that a paid union organizer worked only

117 Id. at 454. The Court held that the "breadth of section 2(3)'s definition is striking: The
Act
squarely applies to 'any employee."' Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 2803, 2808 (1984) (the Act
covers undocumented aliens).
178

Town & Country, 116 S.Ct. at 454.

171Id. The LMRA provision "forbids an employer (e.g., the company) from making payments to a

person employed by a union, but simultaneously exempts from that ban wages paid by the company
to 'any... employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee' of the company." Id. at 454.
180Id.
181

Town & Country, 116 S.Ct. at 455-56.

' Id. at455 (citing Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348 (1992)) (using
common-law test to distinguish between "employee" and "independent contractor" under Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001).

183Id. at 455.

lThe Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
Since ...the relation of master and servant is dependent upon the right of the
master to control the conduct of the servant in the performance of the service,
giving service to two masters at the same time normally involves a breach of duty
by the servant to one or both of them .... [A person] cannot be a servant of two
masters in doing an act as to which an intent to serve one necessarily excludes an
intent to serve the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 226 cmt. a (1958).
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for the union and could not be an employee of the employer. 85 They reasoned
that the union's [salting] resolution, allowing union employees to work for
nonunion employers, was only a scheme to organize. 86 Town & Country argued
that allowing the union organizer to work for the company would result in
possible "harm [to] the company" by "[the employee] quitting [his job] when the
company needed [him]" or "[by] disparaging the company to others" or "even
sabotaging the firm or its products."' 87 Town & Country concluded that the
organizer was a servant of the
union and controlled by the union and could not
188
be a servant to the company.
The Supreme Court rejected all of Town & Country's arguments. In
regards to Town & Country's first argument, common-law of agency, the Court
said it failed because the "Board correctly found that it lacks sufficient support
in common law."' 89 The Court reasoned that the Board is statutorily mandated
to define the term "employee" by Congress and that the Board's definition is
wholly consistent with common law. 9 ' As to Town & Country's second
argument, the Court looked to the Restatement' 9' and concluded that an employee
could work for two employers, as to one act, as long as it did not "involve
abandonment of the service to the other."' 9 2 Accordingly, "service to the union
for pay does not 'involve abandonment of... service' to the company," said the
Court.' The Court explained that an organizer could not abandon his job during
a normal working day because the organizer would be under the control of the

18'

Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 455.

116 Id. at 456.
187Id.

'8

Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 455.

"I

Id.at456.

19oId. at 455.

...Id.at 456. The Restatement states that a "person may be servant of two masters... at one time
as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF AGENCY

'

§ 226 (1958).

Town & Country, 116 S. Ct at 456.

193
Id.
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employer not the union.'9 4 However, if the union employee exercised his right
to organize during nonworking hours, the Court said this was no more than
moonlighting (having a second job).'95 The Court analogizes this act as being no
different than a police detective
working undercover as a waiter at a restaurant
96
attempting to pick up clues.
The Court went on to say that Town & Country's abandonment argument
was not convincing because union organizing activities are a protected act and
that the employer had no legal right to demand an employee, as part of his job,
to give up this protected activity.' 97 Furthermore, the Court dismissed Town &
Country's argument concerning acts of disloyalty because the record was devoid
of any such acts.' 98 But, the Court did suggest alternative solutions to allay Town
& Country's fears. For example, the company could use discipline, file a
complaint with the NLRB, create a policy limiting nonemployee access to
company property, offer fixed-term contracts that would forbid quitting without
notice, or informing law enforcement agencies (possibly having the employee
arrested if found to have destroyed company property). " The Court maintained
that the "[u]nion's resolution2 . contains nothing that suggests, requires,
encourages, or condones impermissible or unlawful activity." '' Also, the Court
reasoned that any employee might leave an employer's company for a better job
and that a paid union organizer should be treated no differently than any other
employee.1 2 Furthermore, the Court concluded that if a paid organizer would
attempt to sabotage the company through unlawful acts so too might a dissatisfied
worker.20 3 To this end, the Court held "this does not mean they are not

194id.
195 Id.
196 Id.

' Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 456.
198 Id.

'99

Id. at 457.

20

Brief for IBEW, supra note 51, at Ia & 2a app.

21 Town & Country, 116 S. Ct. at 456.
202

Id.

203

id.
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'employees.""'2 4 Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that union organizers or
"salts" who participate in a salting campaign are employees of the employer
whom they seek to organize. As a result, they are entitled to be protected under
the antidiscrimination provisions of the NLRA." 5
VI. ANALYSIS
A.

Labor Organizations
Employers seek to paint 'salting' as a sinister or underhanded
union organizing technique. It is important to recognize this
attack as an attempt to divert attention from the employer's actual
goal of preventing unions from engaging in traditionally
protected organizing activities. This attack by employers also
serves to divert attention from the reality of the growing rate of
illegal conduct of employers under the NLRA. Statistics show
an alarming increase in illegal discharges under Section 8(a)(3).
Comparing the early 1950s with the late 1980s shows that 'the
incidence of illegal firing increased from one in every 20
elections adversely affecting one in 700 union supporters to one
in every four elections victimizing 1 in 50 union supporters. '26

In a landmark case, the Supreme Court's decision in Town & Country
resolved the ambiguity over the term "employee." Labor organizations have
hailed Town & Country as a tremendous victory dealing a severe blow to the
nonunion employers discriminatory tactics.2 7
Many labor leaders have
proclaimed that this ruling will increase their memberships and union organizing

204

Id.

205Hoeschen, supra note 91, at 399; see also Montwieler, supra note 8, at d5.

206 Hearing Before the House Comm. on Economic and EducationalOpportunitiesSubcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations, 104th Cong., Congressional Hearing Testimonies (October 31, 1995)
(statement of Risa L. Lieberwitz, Asso. Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell
Univ.) [hereinafter Statement by Lieberwitz].
207 Frank J. Murray, JusticesApprove Union Tactic of InfiltratingFirms to Organize, WASHINGTON

TiMEs, November 29, 1995, at A6.
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efforts. 2 8 Robert Georgine, president of the AFL-CIO Building and Construction
Trades department, said "the ruling . . . puts a legal foundation under our
organizing efforts."2 9 In addition, John J. Barry, president of the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, portrayed this ruling as retribution for "all
workers who have seen their right to organize into unions badly eroded in recent
years." ' O Even the Chairman for the NLRB proclaimed this decision as a major
victory.211
Many union supporters are boasting that the Supreme Court has restored
the rights of unions to organize once again.212 Union officials have already cited
numerous benefits from the Court's ruling. These include: (1) giving unions
more access to the nonunion workers; 213 (2) allowing nonunion workers more
freedom in forming a union without the employer's interference;2" 4 (3) exerting
more pressure on employers and how they do their business;21 5 (4) discouraging
employers from blacklisting union members; 216 (5) curbing prevalent and unlawful
hiring practices by employers;217 and (6) it will remain a vital weapon in their
"salting" campaigns. 218 Advocates for the unions are hoping that this decision is
208

Mower & Lockett, supra note 12, at d5. Allan H. Weitzman & Kathleen M. McKenna, According

to the Supreme Court, Employers May Not Refuse to Interview Applicants Solely for Being Union

Organizers,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 1996, at B4, 18. The officials of the AFL-CIO announced that "$20
million dollars will be funded towards organizing this year." Id.
209 Joan Biskupic, Court Backs Unions' On-Job Organizing; Unanimous DecisionAllows 'Salting,'
WASH.
210

PosT, Nov. 29, 1995, at F03.

Savage & Silverstein, supranote 2, at DI.

2. Biskupic,

supra note 209, at F03; Murray, supra207, at A6. ("NLRB Chairman William B. Gould
IV said the ruling shows 'there is no inconsistency in loyalty to the collective-bargaining process and
loyalty to the firm for which one works."').
212

Jim Flasch, Unions, Employers and 'Salting,'MARKETPLACE MAG., Jan. 9, 1996, at v7, n4, Section

1.
213

Id.

214

Id.

215

id.

226 Savage & Silverstein, supra note 2, at F03.
217

Id.

210

Crowe, supra note 14, atA39.
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the stimulus that many labor organizations needed to bring more members into
their folds. Finally, the bottom
line is that this decision sends a message that
219

union people have rights,
B.

too.

Nonunion Employers and Friends

The "salting" issue was also very important to the business community
and losing this decision was very disturbing. 22 Nonunion contractors have
admitted that the Court's ruling is a definite setback, but they have plans to

continue the fight. 22 ' The business community has gone to Congress to pursue
their battle against the Court's ruling.222 They expect Congress to redefine the

219 Flasch, supra note 212, at Section 1.
220 Crowe, supra note 14, at A39. "Mona Zeiberg, senior counsel for labor and employment law at

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said the business community is upset by this ruling. 'It is pretty
significant,' Zeiberg said." Id.

221

Flasch, supranote 212, at Section 1. Flasch reveals that:
The case, seen from the outset as far-reaching, attracted a great following among
organizations near and far from the construction industry. As a result of that
interest, four institutions - the Associated General Contractors (AGC), Associated
Builders and Contractors (ABC), the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
and the Labor Policy Association - all filed amicus curiae ('friend of the court')
briefs supporting Town & Country'sposition.

Id.
22

Crowe, supra note 14, at A39. Crowe states:

The business community's fierce opposition to salting surfaced several months
ago in a rider to an appropriations bill passed by the House. That rider barred the
National Labor Relations Board from investigating or prosecuting any cases
involving the tactic until the Supreme Court ruling came down. It would have
effectively stopped the NLRB from responding to any unions' charges that
employers either refused to hire their organizers, or fired them.
Id In addition, Rep. William F. Gooding (R-Pa), chairman of the House Committee on Economic and
Educational Opportunities, denounced the use of "salts" as a government-imposed disruption of the
workplace that increases "the cost of doing business by forcing the employer to defend itself against
frivolous or meritless charges filed" with NLRB. He left open the prospect that legislation is needed
to undo the Supreme Court holding. Mower & Lockett, supra note 12, at d5. Finally, Paul Barrett of
the Wall Street Journal wrote that "[s]eparately, House Republicans have attached a 'rider' to
appropriations legislation that would make it much more difficult, if not impossible, for unions to bring
this type of case." Paul Barrett, Employers Can'tDiscriminateAgainst PaidUnion Organizers,WALL
ST. J., Nov. 29, 1995, at B6.
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'
term "employee" in an effort to stop this tactic of "salting."223
Business leaders
are literally screaming that the Federal labor laws need to be changed in order to
reflected the intent of Congress.224 Further, business leaders are proclaiming that
the Court's decision will essentially put them out of business.22 They argue that
an employee cannot have two masters and that they cannot have people working
for them whose sole purpose is put them out of business.22 6 Many of these
organizations feel that with the NLRB as an advocate, and the Court's decision
by their side, unions have added ammunition to their arsenal in pushing for more
union organizing."' These business people want to stop this cancer of "salting"
before it spreads into other industries.228 One business leader stated "[t]his case
now impacts on all working men and women including those who do not want
to be organized. 229

C.

What Happens Now?

On its face, the Court's decision appears to have settled the dispute over
the definition of the term "employee." However, a few more questions remain
concerning the Court's opinion that should be addressed. Such as, are employers
and the unions overstating their concerns over this decision? How will this
decision impact collective bargaining? Is this decision advantageous to the unions
using the salting tactic and if so, how? What are the employers really worried
about? The remaining portion of this comment will attempt to discuss these
questions.

' Flasch, supra note 212, at Section 1. "As a result of the court decision, ABC [Associated Builders
and Contractors] now will work through Congress to get the definition of employee redefined so that
union 'salts' cannot be working for the union and trying to organize individuals on ajob site while also
being employed by the nonunion contractor." Id. "Several said they expect congressional action to
ban the tactic, among them Dan Yager, general counsel of the Labor Policy Association." Murray,
supra note 207, at A6.
4 Mower & Lockett, supranote 12, at d5.
2 Murray, supra note 207, at A6. AFL-CIO spokesman, James B. Parks, said "What does it benefit
a union to drive a company out of business? That means people don't havejobs." Id.
226

Id.

227Crowe,

22

supra note 14, at A39.

Murray, supra note 207, at A6.

"9 Flasch, supra note 212, at Section 1.
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The excitement over the Town & Country decision by the American labor
force could be grossly overstated. However, the significance of the Court's
holding was crucial for the continued implementation of the "salting" tactic.
Because employers have to recognize union organizers as employees, the "salting"
campaigns will remain a viable strategy. The companies have to afford the union
organizers the same treatment as other potential employees or applicants. The
Town & Country decision will give union organizers more access and a better
way to communicate with the nonunion employees. But, unions have to be aware
that the "salting" tactic does not mean overall union organizing will be successful.
Moreover, unions must be cautious because employers still retain control
over their workplaces and employees. They are still in control of the hiring and
firing and they also have statutory protections. Furthermore, at the jobsite, the
employers still have broad "managerial power."23 It is widely recognized that a
employer has a "business justification in restricting employee solicitation and
distribution activities during worktime and in work areas.'3 Although employees
are protected in exercising their section 7 rights at the workplace, they must do
it during non-working hours to be free from employer discrimination.232 Also, it
is imperative that there be at least two employees on the nonunion jobsite to
qualify for protection while participating in concerted activities. Consequently,
depending on which side one stands, the reading of this decision will be either
broadly or narrowly construed, depending on the circumstances. Thus, it is this
author's opinion that the Town & Country decision settled the ambiguity in the
definition of employee and as a result, it may limit the employer's illegal tactics.
The Town & Country decision has the potential to limit illegal tactics by
the employers. For example, it may decrease the employer's coercive opposition
to unionization. But, it could also increase the employer's use of labormanagement consultants to help the company fight unionization. This decision
might stop the employer's illegal tactics during an organizing drive. For instance,
the employer will be more cautious when giving captive audience speeches about
the negative effects of unionization. Also, the threats of the operation shutting
down, if the union wins a representation election, should be eliminated.
Likewise, the incentives of increased pay and fringes will be stopped as a method
of swaying a representation election. The rationale for this theory is that these
practices are unfair labor practices and, with union employees on the job to report
these tactics, the employers should be leery of conducting these practices.

230

Statement by Lieberwitz, supra note 206, at 4.

23

Id.

232

Id. at 4-5.
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Essentially, for the salting campaigns to operate effectively, the employers have
to commit unfair labor practices for it to be successful.
However, there are several weaknesses in this decision. For example,
Town & Country will likely have no effect on collective bargaining or labor laws.
As a result, if a paid union organizer is hired by a nonunion employer and the
union wins a representation election, they have only won a battle not the war.
The union must now negotiate a contract with the anti-union company. Under
the NLRA, the employer has a duty to bargain in good faith but he does not have
to agree to anything. The Town & Country decision does nothing to change this
obligation. For an employer to continue operating nonunion, it only has to
bargain over wages and hours. It does not have to give in to other worker
demands. If the parties cannot reach an agreement and an impasse occurs, the
employees have to take the company's last best offer. Of course, if the
employees strike, the employer can continue to operate with replacement workers.
The bottom line is that this decision may allow organizers more access to the
nonunion employees and assist in winning an NLRB election. But, this does not
guarantee the employees a decent collective bargaining agreement. In addition,
the employers will continue to fire pro-unionists as a method of scaring
employees into believing that the same thing will happen to them if they support
the union. They will continue to commit unfair labor practices because the
punishment is slight and it sends a message to the workers of just how far the
company will go to defeat unionization. Finally, the Town & Country decision
will not preclude employers' exploitation of the current law.
What advantages will the Town & Country decision grant to the unions
using the salting tactic? First, the use of salting is cost-effective, it's cheap!
With union memberships declining, expending money for organizing is a
significant issue. The smaller unions cannot afford large organizing drives as
well as the larger unions. The salting tactic will be useful because if the
organizer is hired by the targeted company, the company will be paying the union
organizer. Second, the decision will allow union organizers more access to the
nonunion employees on the jobsite. Union organizers are not always free to go
on company property for organizing purposes. Third, for the nonunion
employers, this decision could manifest serious implications when the "salting"
tactic is used.
The biggest benefit from the Town & Country decision is the position
employers are put in when numerous unfair labor charges are filed by the unions.
That is, union organizers are now viewed as bona fide employees and are fully
protected by the NLRA, as any other employee would be. If a paid union
organizer goes to a nonunion employer for a job, the employer is put into a
seemingly hopeless situation. When seeking employees, the employer has to
consider the union organizers, otherwise, the organizer will file labor charges that
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the employer did not hire or consider him because of his union status and could
probably win his case. Under the Town & Country decision, it appears that the
nonunion employer cannot refuse to consider the union organizer as long as he
is qualified. Fourth, the "salting" tactic can prohibit an employer from using a
temporary hiring agency. Finally, this decision will allow unions to organize the
company from the top-down. Instead of going to the employees, the union will
seek to get the company to recognize the union, thereby bypassing the NLRB
election. The union's objective is to file an enormous amount of unfair labor
charges with the intent to break the company or have it sign a contract. The
companies have to pick between the lesser of two evils: (1) go bankrupt trying
to pay large backpay awards that the union organizers will win, or (2) settle with
the union to drop the labor charges and recognize the union.
The final question is: why did the employers raise such a fuss over the
union organizer as employees? Town & Country argued among other things, that
it was worried about employees abandoning the company and being disloyal. The
disloyalty argument is ironic in that the company expects the employees to be
loyal but the company does not have to do the same. There are people in every
walk of life that are members of other organizations and still continue to work for
their employers. Town & Country argued that union organizers may abandon the
company when it needs them. This is a silly argument because in an at-will
employment situation, which this was, any employee, whether he works for
management, is a union organizer, or is just an employee, can quit or leave an
employer with or without notice or cause. You might say that these arguments
were nothing more than a smoke screen for Town & Country's real motive. Its
real motive was "to immunize itself from hiring employees who are motivated to
unionize the workplace."2 33 Nonunion employers do not want their employees
unionized because unions give employees a voice in the workplace, it allows for
self-determination. Many employees do not know what their rights are. As a
result, employers exploit those employees because of this lack of information and
they want to keep it that way.
VII. CONCLUSION

On its face, the Supreme Court's ruling is a tremendous victory for the
unions. The Court was asked to define the term "employee" which had been a
point of controversy for many years. The strength of the Court's ruling is that
the definition allows union applicants, whether they are volunteers or paid by the
union, to apply for nonunion jobs. For the Supreme Court to have ruled
otherwise would have created a "chilling effect on all employees' choice to

233

Statement by Lieberwitz, supra note 206, at 5.
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engage in union activities."234 Moreover, unions are given a cost-effective and
a new communicative device to contact nonunion employees at the workplace.
Overall, the benefits of the Town & Country decision should far outweigh the
weaknesses of it. From the union's standpoint, the Town & Country ruling gave
them the green light to pursue the "salting" plan in other industries.235
However, even though the Town & Country Court made a well-reasoned
decision which should eliminate the confusion over the term "employee" between
the NLRB and the various Circuits Courts throughout the country, American labor
unions have not won the war. This decision may be a step in the right direction
for unions, but it is too early to tell whether this decision will be "the key that
unlocks the workplace door or whether nonunion contractors can muster enough
support in Congress to reverse the Supreme Court's holding."2 36 Nonetheless,
many American labor unions consider this victory to be great and regardless of
how narrow or effective this decision is, the impact of the decision could create
a "pandemic alert for union solidarity and organizing on the job site."237
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